P hilosophy, however abstract and analytical it is, can be only as sound as the social evidence and theories on which it relies. Bioethics is still dominated, though, by outdated Piagetian age-stage theories of child development that tend to emphasize children's ignorance, inexperience, and inability to make truly informed autonomous decisions, as if the mind and conscience grow as slowly as the body. 1 A few years ago, for instance, a review of literature on informed consent, published in these pages, included no examples of studies involving people less than eighteen years of age. 2 If, as Locke and Kant held, children are prerational and premoral, like animals or machines, then their views can hardly be informed or trustworthy, and their responses would be either mindless compliance or irrational resistance. 3 Research has found, however, that some children do have the understanding, skill, and maturity to make decisions about their health care. Our purpose in this paper is to set out evidence we have gathered demonstrating that children can fulfill the criteria of competent decision-making as identified in some of the landmark documents on informed consent to medical research. We use examples from a study we conducted of children who have insulin-dependent (also known as juvenile or type 1) diabetes. 4 Consent is usually considered in relation to surgery or medical research, although AngloAs a study involving diabetes care demonstrates, children sometimes have a much more sophisticated capacity for taking charge of their own health care decisions than is usually recognized in bioethics. Protecting these children from their disease means involving them in their treatment as much as possible, helping them to understand it and take responsibility for it so that they can navigate the multitude of daily decisions that become part of the diabetes medical regimen.
Children's Competence to Consent to Medical Treatment
American law actually expects consent to be elicited before any touching of the patient. One study found that some children in a hospital setting were most upset by having their name tag fastened around their wrist. 5 Such minor routines for practitioners may be major issues for patients, and one aspect of respect for consent is practitioners' sensitivity to patients' varying views and values.
An earlier study of one hundred and twenty children who ranged from eight to fifteen years old and were undergoing, on average, their fourth elective operation showed that adults caring for them respected informed decisions about major surgery made by some children as young as seven years old. 6 Instead of age or ability, the research found that experience is the salient factor in the children's intellectual and moral competence. One craniofacial surgeon considers that "most" children can actively participate in major surgery decision-making at about eight years. 7 Dealing with diabetes, however, involves decisions that are both harder and easier than those concerning surgery. Although often complex, surgical decisions are usually specific and can be clearly explained. The fear, pain, and disruption of surgery are also time-limited, even if the effects are not. In contrast, a person diagnosed with diabetes must make daily minor decisions about diet, injections, and blood tests as part of a continuing, lifelong commitment-a practical consent associated with profound existential and partly unpredictable changes in personal identity and daily life. These children's decisions about diet are made in a social context and require them to weigh simple mundane choices versus starkly life-threatening risks, everyday versus complex endocrinological knowledge, and their peers' versus their health professionals' conceptions of the good life. Daily management of diabetes illuminates exceptionally clearly children's intellectual, moral, and social competencies because it is about controlling sugar, a key currency and symbol of childhood. In many cultures, confectionery is used to signify affection, popularity, and inclusion; to mark passing time (for example, birthday cakes); to celebrate holidays (for example, chocolate Easter eggs); to reward, bribe, or barter; and (by withdrawal) to threaten and punish. Against this dominant sugar economy, children with diabetes have to avoid sugar and cope skillfully with being different from their friends without losing friendship and respect.
Developmental versus Social Research
T raditional developmental psychological research uses methods that are liable to intimidate children, and it thereby can underestimate their actual abilities and produce findings that appear to confirm the old developmental theories. 8 These methods include standardized questionnaires with representative (healthy) groups, testing of hypotheses, use of "laboratory conditions," and "objective" observations. They are conducted in a cool, detached manner that can make children-and adults-nervous, which can make them perform less well. They can underrate children's knowlege not only by assuming that many of their replies are wrong, but also by ignoring children's unexpected replies, which may show good sense.
In contrast, the fairly rare examples of qualitative social research with children who have chronic illness or disabilities reveal that they have far higher levels of knowledge and competence relating to their condition. 9 These studies rely on observations and interactions with children in the context of their everyday lives; examine topics in which the children are expert; employ semistructured narrative interviews that may make use of toys, drawings, and other nonverbal media; avoid normative tests and judgments; and ask interviewers to try to establish a friendly rapport with children and to understand their per- spectives and reasoning. 10 The newer social research is also informed by cogent critiques of child development theory, 11 and it investigates how children's competencies are recognized, denied, encouraged, or inhibited. Our research employed these newer sociological approaches to investigate children's views about their diabetes, their share in managing their care, and their everyday likes and dislikes, achievements, and problems. We observed diabetes clinics in three English hospitals-two in inner-city, multiethnic, disadvantaged areas, and one in a commuter town. With their consent, we held semistructured, tape-recorded interviews with twenty-four children, three to twelve years of age; twenty-nine of their parents (usually with their child); two pediatricians; and two diabetes nurses. The mean age at interview was 8.7 years, and the mean age at diagnosis was 6.0 years (see table  1 ). Fifteen of the families in a deliberately diverse sample were contacted by post with information leaflets and requests to opt into the research, and they were interviewed at home. Nine families were contacted and interviewed in a diabetes clinic. Some children drew pictures. The children chose their own research names to protect their anonymity.
Boys Girls
To encourage detailed narrative responses, the interviewers asked openended questions, such as, "What was the best day during your last holidays?" The interview transcripts were systematically read, reread, and analyzed for themes raised by the interviewees 12 -such as their views on normality-and for their direct and indirect replies throughout the session to the main research questionnamely, when do children begin to be willing and able to take an active part in managing their diabetes care? The replies were then examined to see whether some of the children could meet the criteria for informed and voluntary consent.
The following sections take key criteria from the Declaration of Helsinki, which is mainly about informed consent, and the Nuremberg Code, which is mainly about voluntary consent. 13 Most of the subthemes noted under each criterion are quoted from those documents, although a few terms have been added to help define the criteria. The criteria are informed consent based on understanding the nature and purpose of the intervention, the likely effects, and any alternatives; sufficient comprehension to be able to make and signify an enlightened decision; voluntary consent, understood as free power of choice, with the autonomy that includes the courage and resolve to stick to the decision whatever the outcome; and the legal capacity to give consent.
Informed Consent: Understanding the Intervention I n type 1 diabetes, the pancreas no longer secretes insulin. The main purpose of insulin, which must be injected at least twice daily, is to prevent blood sugar levels (glycaemia) from rising too high (hyperglycaemia) or falling too low (hypoglycaemia). Too high a dose can induce a "hypo" and cause a coma and, in rare cases, death. Too low a dose and consistently high glycaemia make a person feel unwell and cause very serious long-term morbidity (including amputation, blindness, and renal problems) and early mortality-problems that are suffered by one third to one half of British adults who have diabetes. 14 Here's the explanation offered by David (eleven years of age):
It's an illness and an organ in your body isn't working, and it's stopped producing this liquid, and you need this liquid to turn sugar into energy, and this liquid is insulin, and so you have to have injections of it. And you can't have so much sugar in your food. The children's embodied knowledge of hypers and hypos enables them to understand the nature and purpose of their treatment-part of what must be understood to be able to give informed consent. They talked of being faint and hungry, of turning white or blue with hypos. Simba (seven) was asked why insulin is important.
Simba: Cos you're diabetic. If you don't take it, I can die. While her mother described hypos, Maisie (three) showed the researcher how hypos make her feel "wobbly" by shaking her arms. Having been ill with hypers, exhausted, white, and thin for months before the diagnosis, Nicola showed by her explanation of insulin that she intensely understood it is the "key that turns sugar into energy." (Nicola was eleven when interviewed, but she began giving such explanations when she was as young as four years of age.) Some children were so ill when they were diagnosed that they required intensive care. At times, some lost consciousness while in hypos and were rushed to hospital. They vividly recalled these occasions. Their formal endocrinology knowledge may have been rudimentary, but they knew their treatment was life-sustaining.
All the children also understood the methods and means of daily treatment because they shared in performing these. Jessie (six): . . . when she's feeling low you must always give her some sweets, and when she's feeling high you must always, always not give her sweets, you must give her a sandwich or something.
Interviewer: And how would I know if she's high or low?
Jessie: She'll tell you, I'm sure.
Interviewer: Is there anything else I need to do to look after myself?
Jessie: Yes, you need to do your blood sugar and your leg, but I think your mummy will have to do the leg, and yourself to do your finger. Here's your finger prick, and here's your pen.
Interviewer: Okay, and what do I do with the finger prick?
Jessie: There's a little pricker inside, and you have to push the end, and there's a little button, and you have to twist it, and then you have to press it and it makes a hole in you, and then you have to squeeze out blood, and then put it on the special tab, and put it into the machine, and then you have to see how high or low you are so you can have some treats or not. So that's how you do it.
Some younger children performed their own blood tests and injections, such as Nicola and DJ (six), whereas some older ones preferred to rely on their mother. Children also explained how they measured their blood sugar levels and gradually learned to assess their carbohydrate intake, adapt their diet, and meet their changing needs. 15 The children also understood the duration of the treatment, even though "duration" is a somewhat complex concept in the context of diabetes care. "Duration" might refer to the pace and timing of treatment; through daily cycles, the children came to understand, plan, and manage their constantly recurring needs for snacks, meals, and insulin. "Duration" might also refer to the lifelong nature of the condition. Of course, it can be hard at any age to prepare for life ten or thirty years ahead, so lacking that ability would not be uniquely a limitation of childhood. All the same, the children indicated some understanding of permanence, as evidenced in their practical acceptance and adaption of their lives to cope with diabetes. Some spoke of always having diabetes. John, diagnosed at age ten, said during his first blood test "they just pricked it . . . and I thought, 'Oh God I'll have to do this for the rest of my life.'" The children did not talk or behave as if they expected an end and a cure, even if they may have longed for that.
Understanding the Benefits, Hazards, Inconveniences, and Discomforts H owever benign and well-intentioned the caring adults who surround them, children suffer unless they can sense and trust in adults' benevolence. Human beings are meaning-makers. Even premature babies learn to anticipate when they will have a heel prick or a caress. 16 It is logical for young children to believe that diabetes treatment (needles, withheld sweets, pain, and frustration) is worse than the disease. Therefore, unless they are very clearly informed and reassured, children risk experiencing a form of the "torture" that consent is designed to prevent. In its extreme form, torture involves "breaking down a person's sense of identity" by inducing a sense of utter helplessness, unpredictability, and confusion. 17 Children must have some faith that the benefits of treatment outweigh its hazards, inconveniences, and pain. At first, this can be very difficult to establish: "It hurt so much, and I had no idea what was wrong with me and what they were doing" (David, eleven, diagnosed at eight). As mentioned, children who were extremely ill before diagnosis were better able to understand costbenefit equations that justified their lifesaving treatment. Moogum, diagnosed when she was five years old, said, "My sister was at home in bed, and she was crying because she thought I was dead." Guy, diagnosed just after his sixth birthday, remembered being frightened, alone in a hospital room, and on a drip. "There was nobody, no one to talk to, there was no little boys. . . . I was almost dead." One mother and Alex (eleven), both of whom had severe needle phobia, experienced fear and horror, although Alex remembered, "I was about five. Yeah, it was really tough on me. . . , but I gradually got on alright," thanks to explanations and support. Alex also recalled wanting, at ten years of age, to become independent enough to go on a school journey. Children tended to say that "inconveniences" and their irritation and boredom with disruptive treatment routines were worse than pain. A typical comment was that "it's a drag."
The Effects on Health or Person, and the Alternatives W e often assume consent concerns a practitioner's active intervention on behalf of a patient who passively receives it. However, the management of chronic conditions involves numerous medically prescribed interventions-from taking medication to exercising and dieting-that are actually performed by the patient. Following the diabetes medical regimen conscientiously demands persistence, ingenuity, and willpower, which require that the children have a deep understanding of the wanted and unwanted effects of the condition and the treatment on their health or person.
To explore the children's views about the effects of diabetes and their health and person we began with broad questions about what they enjoyed. They had varied interests, and diabetes was not necessarily a topic of great interest or importance to them. They aimed to fit diabetes care in around their daily activities; they repeatedly said, "I just want to get on with my life" and have a "normal" time with friends. 18 A common problem was that adults often obstructed this aim. Teachers singled them out as different, made them miss playtime to stay in and have a snack, or refused to allow them to join school trips. A friend's mother would not allow one girl to join in sleepovers at her house. But alternatives to this kind of behavior were also in evidence. One boy left an unfriendly school and was happy at his new school; another (small) school rearranged snack times so that everyone fitted in with Johnny's needs. For the children, "alternatives" included ways to make their diabetes care quicker, easier, and less obtrusive and painful (or the reverse). For example, several said that they found insulin injections less painful when they injected themselves.
The children were asked what they would tell a newly diagnosed child of their age about diabetes, and they tended to emphasize support, reassurance, and concern for the child's feelings.
Mr. Football (nine): Try to accept it as quickly as possible. [pause] . . . After a while it does get better because after a while you just get used to having injections, and after a while they don't hurt as much.
David (eleven) illustrated the complicated balancing of information and values, aspirations, and sense of identity as a "normal" person with unusual needs when making proportionate decisions. He had heard of "a kid who forgot her injections for a week and she died," and he emphasized that he would tell a newly diagnosed boy that "it's quite difficult to remember your injections, and if you forget them you might die, [but also] try just to get on with your life." David drew a picture of a cheerful-looking boy next to a huge pen, with the caption in capitals, "DON'T LET AN INSULIN PEN PLUS NEEDLE CHANGE YOUR LIFE. YOU'RE JUST THE SAME AS YOU WERE BEFORE."
Comprehension: Weighing Information to Make an Enlightened Decision C hildren from around four years old and up showed that they understood the general principle of managing glycaemia levels, as well as something of the complicated weighing of detailed information. From the start, their parents explained carbohydrate values of different foods. They helped them to choose appropriate meals and to pack their lunches and snacks. Parties and other occasions when treats were given out could be stressful; the children had to watch others enjoy more sweet food than they could have. Ruby's mother described how, at age four, Ruby did not protest immediately when the nursery staff forgot that she was allowed one piece of cake on birthdays, but later asked her mother to remind the staff for next time. That same year, Ruby did not join a friend who found and ate almost a whole box of chocolates while no adults were near, as her subsequent low blood test result proved. When she was five, she was trusted to do a blood test and to decide herself how many sweet things she could eat at a party.
Children learned to plan their carbohydrate intake based on their glycaemic level, insulin dose, expected activities, and whether the insulin and the food were fast or slow release. In Britain, most families are expected to try to fit diet to the prescribed insulin dose in this way. A few parents and and some of the older children used the more complicated but also more liberating method of adapting the insulin dose to suit the chosen diet. In countries where practitioners promote this newer, more informed and autonomous approach, people achieve better glycaemic control. 19 David (eleven) described how he would increase his insulin dose at a party to be able to have extra treats. "If it was after [my insulin dose] I would tend to have two or three [a small amount of treats]; if it was before I would have some and then I would give myself a couple of extra units." Jimbo's (eleven) mother described a message he left for her on their answering machine, which said, "I'm twenty [high], so I need some rapid [release insulin], but I don't know . . . ," adding that he was not sure if his mother would advise a dose of two or three units, "so I'm giving myself two." The high risk of an overdose and the fact that parents cannot always be present to guard against it means that parents and children must develop a mutual, informed trust.
Absorbing information and weighing burdens against benefits before reaching an informed decision requires attending to complicated immediate and long-term considerations. Despite adults' caring support, diabetes decisions can be more difficult for children than for adults. Children's moral agency may not be recognized; their complicated consent may be underestimated as compliance; their sometimes reasoned "refusal" (such as if they decide it is occasionally more important for their social health to join in their friends' activities than to adhere strictly to the regimen proscribed for their physiological health) may be dismissed as foolish resistance, even though adults frequently make such lifestyle choices. While children may be blamed for poor glycaemic control, their hardwon success may be attributed to the adults who care for them. Parents and doctors may be understandably loathe to tell children about the serious morbidity and mortality risks posed by diabetes, yet may blame children for irresponsibly failing to balance their short-and long-term interests-today's sweets against their health in twenty years' time. And finally, when type 2 diabetes, which is the result of an unhealthy lifestyle, is mistakenly confused with type 1 diabetes, which often develops in fit people, children, like adults, may wrongly be blamed for their ill health by those who know little about diabetes. This can further undermine respect for and trust in their decisions.
Adults can make any decision for themselves, but an "enlightened" decision made for or by children has to demonstrably serve the child's welfare or best interests. Most of the interviewees showed how even young children could be informed, responsible, and reliable. An exception was Edwina (twelve), who sometimes collapsed at school and had to be taken to hospital. She was unhappy at school, and she may illustrate that children's ability to make difficult choices to promote their health appears to have less to do with age than with the degree of support they believe they are receiving from adults around them. Edwina drew a face, one side smiling, the other side crying, with the caption "diabetes can be good, bad, happy and sad. It can be painful and not painful," suggesting ambiguity and difficulty for herself and those around her in adjusting to her fairly new identity (she had been diagnosed two years earlier). Enlightened decisions link to maturity, wisdom, and discretion. 20 Signifying a Decision C hildren can clearly express consent or refusal in their body language, as well as by speaking or writing and by actively taking or resisting the medication or other prescription. Even the youngest children signified their informed commitment to the diabetes regimen many times a day. If Maisie (three) feels hypo at night, "she shouts and shouts," said her mother, and Holly's mother commented, "By the time she was three she knew when a hypo was coming on. She'd say, 'Mummy, my mouth feels funny, my eyes feel funny.'" Autonomy, Courage, and Resolve B esides the intellectual competence needed for informed consent, voluntary consent involves moral maturity and autonomy, emotions as well as reason, and journeying from fear and rejection of proposed treatment, through doubt and uncertain weighing of the information, toward hope, trust, and confidence in the treatment. 21 The endless regimen, with the hated routines, can be very hard and painful. Alex (eleven) used to scream so much about injections that the neighbors talked about it. He spoke of being "down in the depths" sometimes, and he insisted prior explanations were vital for children, so "they know what's going to happen, so they know they're going to get used it, and just gives them courage as to what's going to happen." Alex echoed a legal ruling from 1767, before the era of anesthesia, that acknowledged the surgical patient's arduous emotional labor: "It is reasonable that a patient should be told about what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put himself into such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation." 22 Children need resolution to accept the diagnosis and new personal identity and lifestyle, and some constantly had to summon up resolve to perform the responsibilities associated with their treatment, such as the four-year-old who hovered the needle over her skin for some time before finding the courage to insert it.
While acknowledging that no one would wish to have diabetes, we asked if anything positive could ever come from having it. Alex replied, "My attitude has got better," and his father said, "I think he's responsible beyond his years. I think he's had to be. His teacher even said, 'If you give him a job he'll do it, and within a certain time.' . . . He's mature beyond his years." James's mother said he is "a regular kid," but "for ten years old, it's quite scary sometimes, how mature he can be, [and] for a seven-and-ahalf-year-old [when diagnosed] to overcome that at that age. . . ." DJ's mother commented: "I sometimes forget that he is only six. He's very responsible. . . . Diabetes-wise he's very gown up. . . . I would trust him. . . , but I wouldn't trust them," meaning adult friends who might look after DJ but were more likely than DJ to forget to supervise his diabetes care.
The courage to consent includes willingness to take responsibility for risky decisions without blaming others, despite subsequent problems. Others have argued that even if children are able to give consent, it is unwise and maybe unkind to burden them with the guilt and blame they might feel if things go awry. But pediatricians used to argue that it was unfair to ask parents to consent to major risky decisions for the same reason. 21 And in any event, for children with diabetes, their health care is very likely to be in their own hands, and they are very likely to feel blame and guilt if, for example, they have too many hypers. In our small sample, the children who achieved the best control were those who were most informed and trusted to plan their care, and although the pattern of cause and effect here is not definite, the association between adults' trust and children's confidence and responsibility is clear.
Voluntary Consent V oluntary consent means "free power of choice, without force, fraud, deceit, duress, or any overreaching or ulterior form of constraint or coercion." 23 This idealized notion of freely given consent has been criticized on several counts. It was originally conceived for "nontherapeutic" medical research, not for beneficial medical treatment. 24 No one is omnipotent or omniscient; indeed, without numerous influences and partial constraints, we would not have a range of options to choose from, nor would we have acquired the values and experiences that inform our choices. Patients are inevitably constrained by their illness, their mortal needs, their limited grasp of medical complexities, and the present boundaries of medical skill and knowledge (no great advances have been made in diabetes care since insulin treatment began around eighty years ago). The survival of patients of any age sometimes depends on their being encouraged or cajoled into complying with treatment. In this negotiation, respect for autonomy mingles with protective care. Yet although there may be a middle ground where persuasion verges on deceit, threats, or pressure, there are clear differences between duress and reasonably "free power of choice" when avoidable pressures are withheld.
Some authors concentrate so much on the pressures that practitioners should refrain from exerting that they seem to forget the patient's agency. Faden and Beauchamp propose, for example, that because of the "many confusing associations surrounding the term 'voluntariness', [it should be replaced by the term] 'noncontrol' that does not have the history and connotation that burdens [sic] the terms 'freedom', 'voluntariness' and 'independence'." 25 This view seems to attribute all agency to the practitioners and none to the patients, whereas "free power of choice" is control by the patient who ultimately makes the decision. Children have traditionally been assumed to lack the Kantian autonomy and will necessary for voluntary decision-making. However, this diabetes study and other research as well demonstrate that at least some young children can make and keep to informed, wise, and brave decisions. Their decisions are "voluntary" in the sense that they are continually being made and remade, with many occasions for choice. Adults cannot always be in control, and undue adult compulsion risks evoking resistance.
Legal Capacity to Give Consent T he final element of competent valid decisions is the legal status of the decision-maker. In Britain, doctors are given no age bar and can accept legally valid consent from children who, in the doctor's clinical judgment, are able to make informed and wise decisions in their best interests. 26 The "age of consent" varies widely between countries, illustrating how an age-or status-based criterion for competence can be contested. Competence may also be assessed either on outcome-that is, by whether the assessor agrees with the decision-or, more fairly, by process-by whether the methods of making the decision seem justifiable. Although U.S. law does not accept minors' consent, the concepts of "assent" and of "mature minors" enable doctors to reIn our sample, the children who achieved the best control were those who were most informed and trusted to plan their care. Although the pattern of cause and effect is not definite, the association between adults' trust and children's confidence and responsibility is clear.
spect the agreement or refusal of certain minors. 27 We suggest that if children can make only those decisions that are perceived by the treating doctor to be "in their best interests," what they are doing cannot count as "giving consent." Consent entails respect for any decision that the person makes, including ones that others might regard as against the person's interests. This is true of consent to, and refusal of, treatment for competent adults. By law, medical decisions for children must be in the child's best interests, but parents' decisions for their children are as much constrained by this requirement as children's decisions are. That constraint does not invalidate parents' consent, so there is no clear reason why it should invalidate children's consent. All patients' decisions and consent are partly limited, first, to what doctors agree to provide, and second, to realistic feasible options. These can involve, for example, consenting to months of dreaded chemotherapy as the least harmful and most hopeful decision, although it is very different from the first but unrealistic preference for instant health. The reality of the constraint of consideration for the child's best interests is seen when doctors take parents to court if they believe the parents are deciding against the child's interests. When the courts are asked to authorize the medical decision to give or withhold treatment, they too are subject to the same best interests constraint. There are reports in the United States, for example, of children being taken into care in order to ensure that they receive Ritalin when their parents have refused to administer the drug for diagnosed hyperactivity.
Also, as is often argued, it is circular to say that children who make wise decisions are competent, and that those who are competent make wise decisions. However, this is the circularity underlying English medical law on minors' consent.
Children's Hidden Abilities T he "children as partners" study illustrates how the experience of chronic illness enables children to develop the understanding, skill, and maturity to make decisions about their health care. Children (and adults) with diabetes often have treats and temporarily suspend strict control and indeed healthy living standards generally. Yet the children in this study showed that from around four years of age they understood the principles and recommended standards of controlling diabetes, they could make informed and wise decisions in their own best interests, and they were capable of trying very hard to keep to their commitments and generally of working with, not against, caring adults. At times, too, even though they possessed the understanding and skill to maintain control over their care, the children wanted their parents to make decisions, do their injections, or talk to the doctor for them.
We are cautious about generalizing from this small project. We do not expect healthy young children, or those with acute or emergency conditions, to demonstrate comparable understanding or maturity. However, our findings are consistent with other qualitative research on the decisions of children with long-term illness or disability and adults' respect for their competence. African, Asian, and South American research projects demonstrate highly developed competencies among young children who are forced to live fairly independently, and in the face of adversity. 28 These findings suggest that advantaged, sheltered children in the richer societies have latent capacities that they need not develop or demonstrate, and that child development theories based on research with advantaged children have mistakenly concluded that young children do not-and therefore cannot, and perhaps should not-have such capacities. Diabetes care provides a rare example of Western children coping with high risk and adversity. Whereas very large surveys are required to support generalizations about, for instance, the capabilities of the average four-year-old, only a few examples are needed to show, as our research does, that at least some "ordinary" young children are well enough in advance of child development theories to pose serious challenges to those theories.
Developmental psychology needs to revise its estimation of children's capacities-and likewise bioethics, given the priority it puts on respect and justice. This revision involves both intellectual work and the harder ethical and emotional task of rethinking deeply held ideologies, such as the belief that adults are always right and must retain all control, or that even when older children can make informed and reasonable decisions, parents should decide for them in the interests of preventing discord and sustaining harmony within the "intimate family." 29 During research interviews, The sustainable consent that the children in our study demonstrated involves continuous moral, emotional, embodied choices, so that it is vital to involve children as much as possible, helping them to "own" decisions that fit as nearly as possible to the person they would like to be and the life they would prefer to have. children and parents repeatedly showed an awareness of their own responsibilities and capabilities that suggests they would regard parents' overruling of children's responsible health care decisions as a violation of parental responsibility and loving family intimacy.
The important question of what to do when competent children make unwise decisions that may have adverse consequences lies beyond the scope of this paper and outside the examples our interviewees gave of their own decision-making, although it has been discussed elsewhere. 30 Because this paper concentrates on children's responses, it has only indirectly reviewed parents' vital protective and nurturing role of fostering children's competence. The findings do suggest, however, that adults' efforts to protect children should include helping them learn as early as possible how they can protect themselves from the severe harms of mismanaged diabetes.
Just as important as the usual question of whether children are competent is the assessment of the concerned adults. Have they given sufficiently clear, relevant information and resolved confusions and misunderstandings? Do they respect the child's reasonable views, decisions, values, and reasoning? Are they willing sometimes to revise their views and to learn from the child? Alice Dreger has shown vividly that parents and doctors do not always understand children's values and best interests, especially when a child has a different anatomy and physiology. 31 The person who is in the body, and is the body, can have unique insights that may be essential for informed decision-making. Woven through daily diabetes decisions are questions that belong to what Arthur Frank has described as a Socratic ethics: What is the good life? How can I attain it? What kind of person do I want to be? And what kind of community do I want to be a member of? 32 Rather than assuming that the more serious the disease and treatment, the less young children can or should be involved in making decisions, the reverse view may be more reasonable. The sustainable consent that the children in our study demonstrated involves continuous moral, emotional, embodied choices, so that it is vital to involve children as much as possible, helping them to feel reconciled to and willing to "own" decisions that fit as nearly as possible to the person they would like to be and the life they would prefer to have. With their parents, and when their parents are absent, children have to work out ways to reconcile restrictions on their lifestyle with the diets and choices powerfully promoted by advertising and enjoyed by their friends. They have to find a way to tell their own story that can help them to feel contented rather than frustrated, coerced, and unfulfilled. They can bring imagination, courage, and humor to answering this Socratic challenge. 33 It is therefore important not to view consent simply as a one-off event involving a test of the child's understanding or ignorance that may find incompetence by making children feel confused, anxious, or alienated. Instead the consent process can nurture and enlarge children's understanding, trust, and confidence, through the sharing and transferring of insights and responsibilities between adults and children.
